Introduction
The principal justification for capital regulation of banks rests on two factors. First, it has a role in ameliorating moral hazard induced by deposit insurance 1 . The problem would not arise if deposit insurance premia reflect true portfolio risk. However, typically the regulator does not have full information on the portfolio risk of a particular bank, which makes setting actuarially fair risk-based premiums difficult 2 . This implies a scope for additional solvency regulation. Indeed, as several authors have shown, risk-based capital regulation plays a role in designing incentive-compatible risk-sensitive deposit insurance under asymmetric information. 3 Second, capital regulation also serves to mitigate negative externalities arising from the failure of a bank. The importance of this "systemic risk" problem 4 has been underlined by the recent financial turmoil in the credit markets that has led to massive central bank and government interventions in many countries around the world. 5 While the above discusses reasons behind capital regulation 6 , this paper focuses on a related but different question. Given that capital regulation is an integral part of bank regulation, what form should it take?
In this paper, we construct a simple framework to analyze this issue. In our model, the risk carried by a bank as well as managerial risk preference are a bank's private information. Our contribution can be summarized as follows. We show that ex ante regulation wastes the private risk information of a bank, while ex post regulation makes full use of it. However, we show that the latter is more vulnerable to the problem of unknown managerial risk-aversion. The results imply that the two forms of regulation are complements, rather than substitutes. We characterize the optimal mix, and describe the scenario in which ex post regulation emerges as the dominant element in the optimal combination, and that in which ex ante regulation dominates. Finally, we use the results to shed light on current concerns arising from Basel II and the credit crunch.
Broadly speaking, there are two distinct forms of capital regulation: ex ante and ex post. One approach is to specify minimum capital requirements as a proportion of a bank's risk weighted assets. This imposes an ex ante constraint on risk taking by a bank, and forces an exogenous link between risk and capital. An alternative design gives a bank freedom to choose capital and portfolio risk. Regulatory intervention is triggered if losses exceed a certain threshold. The threat of intervention endogenously induces a link between risk and capital. Since such a scheme conditions on the outcome of bank actions, this is referred to as ex post regulation.
Basel I, introduced in 1988, imposed pure ex ante constraints. This regime is gradually being replaced by Basel II, the new capital adequacy framework which combines ex post features with ex ante constraints. Pillar 1 of Basel II is dominated by ex ante rules, while pillar 2 introduces explicit ex post elements. Therefore natural questions arise about the efficiency of different forms of capital regulation, and how they fit together. In spite of the considerable practical importance of this issue, the theoretical literature offers little consensus or clarity on the comparison of different forms of capital regulation. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap. In doing so, we clarify the theoretical reasons for inclusion of pillar 2 alongside pillar 1. To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper to address this issue.
Under full information, all regimes are equally efficient. However, as Fama (1985) and others have noted, information asymmetries are endemic to the problem of regulating banks. Once this is taken into account, we show that ex ante and ex post regimes have very different properties.
Therefore, questions about when a particular form should be used, and how different forms fit together are not only theoretically interesting, but also of immediate practical relevance.
As Fama (1985) points out, banks typically have private information on their clients, and this is fundamental to explaining the special nature of banks 7 . Therefore, a bank can usually make a more precise estimate of its own portfolio risk compared to the regulator.
A further source of information asymmetry is the risk preference of a bank, which is typically the bank's private information. In the event of bankruptcy, shareholders usually lose only the capital they contribute.
Such limited liability increases their appetite for risk. On the other hand, the risk preference of bank managers ultimately depends on the firmspecific human capital of the manager, reputational concerns, as well as the form of management compensation. The level of bank capital can also influence the manager's degree of risk aversion. An additional factor is the extent to which the bank is controlled by the management. Management controlled institutions tend to be more conservative than stockholder controlled organizations. For example, Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990) study the relationship between bank ownership structure and risk taking.
They find support for the hypotheses that stockholder controlled banks take more risk compared to manager controlled banks, and that deregulation makes this difference more pronounced.
The discussion above motivates our modelling of informational structure. True portfolio risk as well as the degree of managerial risk aversion are private information of a bank. We judge the success of any regulatory regime against this backdrop of multi-dimensional information asymmetries.
Our main results are as follows. We show that an ex ante regime makes poor use of the expertise of a bank in measuring risk. An ex post regime, on the other hand, fully incorporates the superior private information of a bank about underlying risk; but in doing so, becomes more sensitive to the problem of unknown managerial risk aversion compared to an ex ante regime. This implies that the two regimes are vulnerable to different dimensions of information asymmetry, and their comparison depends on the relative importance of the sources of informational asymmetries. This also suggests that a combination of the two regimes is potentially welfare improving. Even though Basel II combines the two forms of regulation, the theoretical literature largely treats them as substitutes and advocates one or the other. In contrast, we show that a combined regime outperforms either regime. Moreover, if ex post penalties are sufficiently regressive 8 , (we show that a linear penalty function can satisfy this), we get a striking characterization: when solvency is the main regulatory concern, and the bank is well capitalized, the optimal mixture involves a strong form of ex post regulation, combined with a much weaker version of ex ante regulation. For banks with low capital (a situation faced by several institutions following recent subprime-related losses), even early intervention penalties might be problematic. In such cases ex ante regulation plays a more dominant role.
The results above are derived assuming that a bank has superior information on underlying risk. If, however, the bank's ability to assess risk is poor, we show that it is optimal to use only ex ante regulation. The result underlines the importance of tailoring regulation according to the regulator's assessment of the risk management ability of a bank through, for example, backtesting or stress testing of a bank's internal risk measurement models. 9 Such customization is indeed a feature of Basel II.
We relate our results to current trends in regulation and draw policy conclusions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 introduce the model and specify the regulatory benchmark. Sections 4 and 5 analyze ex ante and ex post regulation. Section 6 characterizes the optimal combination. Section 8 considers extensions of the model. Section 9 relates our results to Basel II, offers policy suggestions, and discusses extensions. Finally, section 10 concludes. This paper develops an application to bank regulation from our general work on safety provision Daripa and Varotto (2008) . The results are adapted from that paper, which contains the detailed proofs. Here we simply present the intuition for the proofs.
The Model
As mentioned above, the model is adapted for the case of bank regulation from our work on safety provision Daripa and Varotto (2008) .
Let us briefly summarize the model at the outset. There are two players: a bank manager and a regulator. The manager can invest in a riskless asset and a risky asset, and chooses a portfolio to maximize expected utility. The regulator does not know either the exact risk of the risky asset, or the degree of risk aversion of the manager. The regulator can observe the fraction invested in the risky asset as well as the bank's capital, and wants to limit the probability of bankruptcy. However, given the information asymmetries, the regulator cannot ensure first best. The actual probability of bank default might deviate from the optimal probability. A safety loss occurs if the probability of default is too high, and overprotection loss occurs if it is too low. The regulator's objective is to minimize a weighted average of the two kinds of losses.
We start describing the model by specifying the investment opportunities facing the bank and its objective function.
Investment opportunities of the bank
The total investment is normalized to 1. The bank chooses efficient portfolios of assets. Portfolios are constructed by investing a fraction (1 − α) on a riskless asset, and a fraction α ∈ ℜ on a risky asset. 10 The log return 11 from the risky asset is normally distributed with mean m and standard deviation s. The return from the riskless asset is normalized to 0, and the efficient frontier is a ray from the origin given by m = βs. Let V denote the log return from the bank's portfolio, where V ∼ N(αm, αs). Let σ denote the portfolio risk. Then σ = αs and V ∼ N(βσ, σ).
The bank's objective function
The objective is to specify the choice of α (the fraction of the portfolio invested in the risky asset) for any given capital level. This is the relevant relation because the regulator can observe both capital and α, and therefore specifies regulation to affect precisely this relationship.
For any given level of bank capital, the manager chooses α as follows.
A more risky portfolio earns a higher expected return, but also generates a higher probability of bankruptcy. As noted in the introduction, default is costly for the manager for several reasons including loss of firm-specific human capital investment, erosion of reputation and loss of future income in the wake of bankruptcy, as well as personal liability issues. Taking into account the level of capital (which affects the probability of bankruptcy for any risk level), personal bankruptcy costs, own risk preferences, as well as the benefit from higher risk, the manager decides on a portfolio risk σ. The benefit of higher risk is parameterized by β. For any given β, the manager's choice of risk depends on his sensitivity to the other factors affecting risk preference. The optimal choice of risk therefore varies over
where
This formulation captures the complex factors affecting the manager's decision problem through a managerial "type" ρ. This can be interpreted as the manager's risk aversion factor 12 . This factor increases in bankruptcy costs and private risk aversion. While observing capital conveys information on the managerial type ρ 13 , our analysis rests on the fact that it is not a deterministic function of the level of capital, so that for any given capital level, the regulator faces uncertainty about managerial risk aversion. The informational structure is specified after we set up the regulator's objective function.
The regulator's objective function As noted by Kim and Santomero (1988) , Dimson and Marsh (1995) , Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2000) and other authors, regulators face a trade-off when determining the amount of regulatory capital to be set. Very high capital requirements impose inefficiently high costs on banks 14 . Such a requirement might also inhibit competition by acting as an entry barrier (Dimson and Marsh (1995) ).
On the other hand, low capital impairs solvency. Therefore a regulator faces a tradeoff between safety and efficiency, which determines a socially optimal probability of default. The regulator attempts to ensure that portfolio risk and capital in a bank are consistent with this probability.
Therefore, in the social optimum, capital and portfolio risk (σ = αs) should be such that portfolio losses exceed the capital with a specified probability p (e.g. 0.05% when using annual returns). The recent crisis has led to calls for more systemic banks to face tighter regulation. Note that our analysis can accommodate such concerns -the specified p can be bank specific, and can vary across a parameter capturing the degree of systemic importance of a bank. Our conclusions about optimal capital regulation would then also vary across this parameter. Let K denote the capital level. Given that the initial value of the bank's assets is normalized to 1, the bank is in default when e V < 1 − K or, equivalently, when V < ln(1 − K) ≡ −K. In what follows we refer to this K as capital. 15 This harmless abuse of terminology allows for a clearer presentation.
Given capital K, portfolio choice should ideally be such that Pr( V < −K) = p. This can be written as Φ(−K/σ − β) = p, where Φ denotes the standard Normal cumulative distribution function. It follows that for any given capital level K, and any σ, the socially optimal portfolio risk is given implicitly by
Therefore, the socially optimal risk (denoted by σ 0 ) is
We assume that C > 0 16 . Note that the socially optimal risk is different for banks with different levels of capital. Indeed, regulatory regimes would be different for different levels of capital. For any given K, whenever actual risk is different from the socially optimal risk, there is an efficiency loss. If the actual risk ratio exceeds the optimal risk, we say there is a "loss of safety" because the probability that the bank defaults is higher than the regulatory optimum. On the other hand, when the actual risk falls below the optimal risk, we say there is an "overprotection loss."
Given the capital K held by the bank, the regulator attempts to implement the socially optimal portfolio risk σ 0 . This is a non-trivial problem under asymmetric information. The usual optimization problem is simply to minimize the deviation of the actual portfolio risk from the optimal risk.
However, this is not necessarily appropriate for bank regulation. Given a level of capital, if the actual portfolio risk is lower than the optimal risk (i.e. overprotection loss occurs), it principally penalizes the shareholders of the bank. The reason is that under limited liability the payoff of shareholders is a convex function of the return from investment, implying that they prefer higher risk. If, on the other hand, actual risk is higher than the optimal level (i.e. safety loss occurs), it is primarily a problem for depositors, whose payoff is a concave function of the return from investment, implying a preference for lower risk. In general, the regulator might attach different weights to the interests of shareholders and depositors, i.e. different weights to overprotection and safety loss. Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) argue that solvency (i.e. protection against safety loss) is the main goal of bank regulation because banks are not like other financial institutions. The important difference is that banks have a large number of small depositors who face a free riding problem resulting in poor provision of monitoring of the bank. Therefore, the regulator, who represents the interests of the depositors, has a monitoring role.
A further argument in favor of relatively greater regulatory concern about solvency is the presence of externalities from bank failure. Given significant systemic risk, the regulator needs to ensure that banks internalize the externality. In such cases, the regulator would attach a greater weight to safety loss. On the other hand, overprotection loss might be of importance when it is important to encourage banks to expand lending. 17 We propose a formulation that encompasses such concerns through a regulatory objective function that allows for safety loss and overprotection loss to be weighted differently. The loss is given by:
where ω ∈ [0, 1]. The loss function is the weighted sum of the two types of losses described above. The first element of the sum is the weighted safety loss and the second element is the weighted overprotection loss. We should emphasize that allowing ω to take any value in the unit interval makes this is a more general regulatory objective function compared to simple loss minimization. The weight ω can be thought of as the regulator's "safety bias." ω > .5 represents a positive safety bias. Clearly, if ω = 0, no regulation is trivially the best solution. We ignore this trivial case and assume ω > 0.
Information Finally, we specify the informational structure. The regulator faces two dimensions of asymmetric information. First, the standard deviation s of the risky asset is a random variable uniformly distributed on the interval [s L , s H ]. The realization of s is the private information of the bank manager. The regulator knows only the distribution of s.
Second, the type ρ is the bank manager's private information. From the perspective of the regulator, ρ is a random variable which is uniformly
To ensure that regulation is non-trivial, we need to make a further assumption about the distribution of ρ. This is clarified below.
From (2), the socially optimal portfolio risk is given by K/C. From equation (1), the optimal portfolio risk of a bank with risk aversion ρ is β/ρ. If K/C < β/ρ, there is a safety loss. Of course, for regulation to have any bite at all, there must be some types of bank managers such that K/C < β/ρ. Let ρ 0 be the type whose optimal portfolio coincides with the socially optimal portfolio. Thus,
We proceed with the following general specification. We assume that the managerial risk aversion is not a deterministic function of bank capital.
Specifically, we assume that for any finite K chosen by the manager, the support of the distribution of ρ is such that
If K is infinite, the regulatory problem is obviously trivial, as the risk chosen by the manager is never greater than the socially optimal risk, which itself is infinite. However, for any K that is not unboundedly large, so long as the above inequality holds 18 , there are types ρ < ρ 0 whose optimal risk is higher than the socially optimal risk in the absence of regulation. It follows that, if the regulator observes a finite K in a bank, he faces non-trivial uncertainty about the bank manager's type 19 , and the regulatory problem is non-trivial.
The unregulated optimum. For any type ρ, the optimal portfolio function is the rectangular hyperbola αs = β/ρ. The thicker hyperbola is the socially optimum portfolio risk function αs = K/C. This is also, by definition, the optimal hyperbola of type ρ 0 . Types ρ < ρ 0 take more than socially optimal risk (optimal hyperbolas above the thicker hyperbola), generating safety loss, and types ρ > ρ 0 take less than socially optimal risk (optimal hyperbolas below the thicker hyperbola), generating overprotection loss. Figure 1 summarizes the model. For any given type ρ, the portfolio risk σ = αs is a constant given by β/ρ. Thus in (α, s) space, the optimal choice of ρ is a rectangular hyperbola. The socially optimal portfolio risk is K/C, another constant. Thus this is also a rectangular hyperbola -and coincides with the optimal choice of type ρ 0 .
A Picture of the Model
The figure shows the hyperbolas associated with types ρ H , ρ L and ρ 0 . The positions of the three hyperbolas reflect assumption (5).
For each type ρ < ρ 0 , the optimal choice hyperbola is entirely above the hyperbola of type ρ 0 . Each such type ρ generates a safety loss (but no overprotection loss). For example, the area between the topmost and the middle hyperbolas is the safety loss generated by type ρ L . Similarly, each type ρ > ρ 0 generates an overprotection loss (but no safety loss). For example, the area between the middle and lowest hyperbolas is the overprotection loss generated by type ρ H . The regulator's objective is to minimize a weighted average of these losses, where ω denotes the weight attached to safety loss. We show next how ex ante and ex post regimes attempt to achieve this objective. However, we need to specify the regulatory benchmark first.
The Regulatory Benchmark
Our aim is to model well known regulatory regimes and study their properties. Regulators typically only restrain risk taking. They do not set out to encourage conservative banks to take on further risk. Accordingly, we impose the restriction that under full information, for any ρ > ρ 0 , no regulation is imposed.
We should emphasize that realism is the main reason for this modelling choice. Removing the restriction would complicate the algebra considerably, but leave our policy relevant results qualitatively unchanged 20 . Imposing the restriction also makes it clear that the results comparing the two regimes are not influenced by any relative advantage/disadvantage of any regime in encouraging risk taking.
For any ρ < ρ 0 , and for any s, the optimal regulation forces a choice of α (either through an ex ante constraint or through ex post penalties) such that αs = β/ρ 0 . The only loss then is the overprotection loss arising from types ρ > ρ 0 . Therefore, the regulatory benchmark loss (denoted by EL 0 ) is strictly positive and given by (1 − w)
Using σ = α * s and equations (1), (2) and (4), σ 0 /σ = ρ/ρ 0 . Therefore,
The fact that under full information, regulation cannot attain zero loss is of course due to our assumption that regulation does not encourage risk taking, and therefore cannot eliminate the overprotection loss arising from types that adopt lower risk than is socially optimal.
For any regulation, (EL − EL 0 ) is the distortion caused by the presence of asymmetric information. It is useful to note that the unregulated distortion provides an upper bound to regulatory distortion. If the distortion under any regulation exceeds this level, that regulation is clearly useless and should not be applied. The unregulated distortion is given by
, which can be rewritten as:
Ex Ante Regulation
Ex ante regulation in Basel II (Pillar 1) is characterized by a rule that establishes a direct link between capital and portfolio risk. The regulator can observe capital and α. If the underlying risk s were also observable, the regulator would simply set a capital requirement K = Cαs. The portfolio risk would then coincide with the socially optimal risk (given by (2)), achieving a zero loss.
However, the realization of s is the bank's private information, and regulation is based on the risk as measured by the regulator. For any given level of K, the regulator, by minimizing regulatory loss, specifies a "reg- 
This implies that choosing a s is equivalent to choosing a portfolio constraint α, shown by the horizontal line in figure 2. A higher regulatory risk estimate leads to a lower α, that is, a more stringent portfolio constraint.
In what follows, we use α and s interchangeably.
Next, we need to characterize the optimal choice of s , obtained by minimizing the expected loss. The next section shows that in minimizing expected loss, the regulator faces a trade-off.
The thick hyperbola is the regulatory optimum (i.e. the optimal hyperbola of type ρ 0 ), while the horizontal line is the portfolio constraint.
Figure (a) shows the safety loss and overprotection loss from an ex ante constraint for any type ρ < ρ 0 . In figure (b) , the area between the two curves plus the shaded area is the overprotection loss from any type ρ ′ < ρ 0 .
For types ρ < ρ 0 , both safety loss and overprotection loss occur. The shaded area is the extra overprotection loss over and above benchmark loss.
Finally, if the choice of s is moved to the left, this reduces overprotection loss from any type constrained by regulation, but increases safety loss.
The opposite happens if s is moved to the right. Thus, a trade-off arises between safety and overprotection.
The optimal regulatory estimate s * optimally balances the twin losses, minimizing expected regulatory loss. As the safety bias ω increases (i.e.
the regulator becomes more conservative), the regulatory risk estimate becomes upwardly biased.
An ex ante regime makes poor use of the expertise of a bank in measuring its risk exposure. The regulator imposes a portfolio upper bound, and for all values of s at which this binds, the bank is forced to adopt the same portfolio. The intuition for part (a) is that all types for which the constraint binds are pooled at the portfolio upper bound. Thus, managers are not free to choose high risk portfolios. This reduces the sensitivity of ex ante regulation to the uncertainty about risk preference of the bank manager. The intuition for part (b) is that whenever the regulatory upper bound binds, no use is made of the bank's private information about s, which generates a distortion.
Ex Post Regulation
Under ex post regulation, the bank is allowed to choose portfolio risk without any ex ante constraint. If the losses exceed a specified tripwire, corrective action is imposed. This induces a link between capital and portfolio risk. Such a regime can be thought of as generating an endogenous "softlink" between capital and portfolio risk that contrasts with the exogenous "hard-link" under ex ante regulation. Kupiec and O'Brien (1997) proposed an ex post scheme for capital regulation of market risk. Market risk refers to risk in the trading book of the bank, which is a fraction of the total investment by a bank. Under this proposal, known as the "precommitment" approach, a bank announces a certain level of capital for market risk, and chooses portfolio risk without any ex ante constraint. However, if the bank suffers losses that exceed the pre-announced level of capital, it is fined. A large fine in the event of a loss might be credible if the trading book capital is a small part of total capital.
Here, we investigate ex post regulation for the whole bank. The above approach may not work as fines are difficult to enforce when losses are large relative to the total capital of the bank. Therefore, we should note at the outset that our aim is not to prescribe pure ex post regulation for all banks. Indeed, as the next section shows, the optimal regime combines the two forms of regulation. 22 But as a first step in our analysis we need to study a pure ex post approach in order to understand its properties.
Let us now discuss our approach to ex post incentives. To obviate the problem of fines that may be difficult or even undesirable to impose on a bank that has already suffered losses, one can resort to more general penalties available in the form of gradual interventions by the regulator. (2000) notes, "it is conceivable that the gradual penalties embodied in the structured early intervention and resolution system ... could help to make the precommitment approach, as applied to the entire bank, credible." 24 So long as capital is not too low, this approach is feasible.
We model regulatory intervention following this idea. We assume that corrective actions impose a cost on the shareholders as well as the man-ager of the bank, and the gradual nature of intervention implies that this cost is an increasing function of the extent of loss. While the cost on the shareholders is limited by the level of capital, the regulator might be able to impose additional private costs on the manager. For example, the regulator might initiate action to prevent a manager of a failed bank from being appointed to a similar job for a few years. 25 Disqualification following regulatory action could be detrimental to the manager's (and the bank's) reputation. In what follows, the word "penalty" refers to such regulation-imposed costs. We assume that the expected managerial cost through penalties increases in the total losses of the bank.
We assume that a penalty applies when V < −θK, 0 θ < 1. In general, the penalty function is an increasing function of the extent of portfolio losses in excess of θK (given by | V| − θK = − V − θK). Here, θK is the regulatory tripwire. A general form of the penalty function is given by
In general, θ can vary across different banks. For example, in the FDI-CIA approach, penalties are applied when capital falls below some specified percentage of asset value. Then θ depends on a bank's initial capital to asset ratio. For example, if the initial capital of bank A is 20% of total assets and that of bank B is 10% of total assets, and the tripwire is set at a capital to asset ratio of 5%, θ equals 0.25 and 0.5 for banks A and B respectively.
For banks with very low capital, there might be limited scope for early intervention by the regulator. In such cases, feasible penalties may provide weak incentives, and not able to control all types of managers. Since we simply want to study the properties of ex post regulation here, we assume throughout this section that ex post control is possible (implicitly assuming well capitalized banks). Section 8.2 characterizes the solution when this is relaxed.
Under an ex post regime, two different types cannot be induced to choose the same portfolio. 26 If some type adopts the socially optimal port-folio risk, more risk averse types adopt portfolios with lower risk, causing an overprotection loss to arise, while less risk averse types adopt higherrisk portfolios, and generate a safety loss. A greater penalty leads to lower risk taking by all types. This reduces safety loss (i.e. reduces the proportion of types adopting greater than socially optimal risk) -but at the same time increases overprotection loss. Thus a trade-off arises between safety and overprotection.
Clearly, the reason behind the trade-off here is fundamentally different from that under ex ante regulation. The latter regime faces a trade-off because it makes poor use of the bank's private information about risk.
Here, on the other hand, the trade-off is purely due to the uncertainty about the bank manager's type.
Result 3 (Use of bank's expertise) Under ex post regulation, all information on s is used so that the expected regulatory loss is independent of the distribution of the underlying risk.
The result implies that even if the regulator's information on s is very poor, this is not a matter for concern, since ex post regulation makes full 
Combining Ex Ante and Ex Post Regulation
From propositions 1 and 2 the extent of information on s -rather than that on ρ -is the critical factor in evaluating the performance of an ex ante regime. As the uncertainty about s increases starting from zero, the distortion goes from zero to the maximum (the unregulated level). The complementary nature of the two regimes implies that a combination might be useful. The following result characterizes the optimal combination.
Result 5 The optimal combination always includes a non-trivial version of ex ante constraints.
Finally, if the regulator is mostly concerned about depositor protection and/or faces significant systemic risk, so that ω is close to 1, we get a striking characterization. In this case, the optimal mixture is asymmetric.
One regime is applied in a strong form, and the other in a weak form. The following result shows the exact nature of the asymmetry. The intuition is as follows. Given strong ex post penalties (say), safety loss is very low. At this point, a marginal increase in ex ante constraints does not reduce safety loss very much further, but it does increase overprotection loss. Therefore, if strong ex post penalties are already in place, ex ante constraints should be weakened, and vice versa. In addition, either regime, applied in a strong enough form, is capable of eliminating safety loss. It follows that the regime chosen to be applied in a strong form is the one that generates a lower overprotection loss when applied in a strong form.
Which regime is likely to have a lower overprotection loss when applied in a strong form? Clearly, the answer is ex post regulation if the uncertainty about the manager's type ρ is low relative to that about the underlying risk s. However, the same answer might apply even if the latter condition is not satisfied. A desirable property of penalties is that the penalty is "regressive" in the sense that the marginal impact of a rise in penalties is higher on less risk averse types. Since the marginal reduction in risk is lower for more risk averse types, the optimal risks adopted by the different types get "bunched" together as the penalty level rises.
This bunching effect reduces the effective spread of the distribution of ρ.
Thus, if a penalty structure is sufficiently regressive, the overprotection loss generated by a strong form of ex post regulation is lower than that under a strong form of ex ante regulation. Therefore, an ex post regime is the dominant element of the optimal combination (case (a) in the result above). The following example shows that linear penalties satisfy this property.
Regressive Property and Bunching Effect: An Example with Linear Penalties
As an example of ex post penalty functions, we look at the case of linear penalties. A linear penalty function is given by
, where δ is a positive constant. 27 For general penalties, we used ρ as the index of the level of penalties. We can do the same here, but now δ is an equivalent but more natural index of penalties. In what follows, we will use δ to index penalties for ease of calculation. Since ρ maps one-for-one into δ, this is without loss of generality.
To calculate the effect of the penalty explicitly, we need to specify a managerial utility function. As noted in footnote 12 in the model section, the manager's preferences can be represented by a vN-M utility function − exp(−ρ V). With this specification, expected utility under linear penalty is given by:
where Z = θK/σ + β, and σ = αs. Let σ * denote the optimal risk. The marginal impact of penalties on risk is given by ∂σ * /∂δ, which is negative. As described before, a penalty structure is regressive if the absolute value of this derivative is decreasing in ρ at each δ. Formally, a penalty is
As mentioned above, if this is the case, as δ increases, the optimal risk of lower types fall faster and thus the optimal risks across types get "bunched."
We show the behavior through simulations. Figure 3 plots the optimal choice of σ for different types ρ as the penalty rises. This shows that linear penalties are regressive and give rise to a bunching effect. Next, figure 4 shows the optimal combination of the two regimes for different values of safety bias. Ex post penalties kick in once ω exceeds a critical level, and then steadily get stronger. The ex ante constraint α displays a "U" shape as a function of ω. Initially, the constraint gets stronger (α * falls). As ω rises, the optimal regulation relaxes ex ante constraints and employs more stringent ex post measures. Accordingly, for high safety bias, ex post regime is dominant. Note that the spread of s is relatively small, yet a strong bunching effect makes ex post the dominant regime for high safety bias.
Interestingly, different combinations emerge under high and low values of θ. Lower θ implies that the penalties kick in at lower levels of loss.
In this case penalties are lower, and the ex ante constraint is stricter for most values of ω. A high value of θ implies that penalties apply only after large losses, but in such cases penalties are severe. If penalties with large losses are credible, they generate strong incentives allowing weaker ex ante constraints. parameter values:
The socially optimal risk is K/C = 0.13. Further, the type for which the optimal risk coincides with the socially optimal risk is given by ρ 0 = βC/K = 3.8. Therefore, types ρ ∈ (3.8, 4.6) initially adopt risk below the socially optimal risk, and types below 3.8 initially adopt risk exceeding the socially optimal risk. We have carried out simulations for a wide range of parameter values, and obtained similar results in all cases.
Two Special Cases

Poor Bank Information on Risk
We have assumed so far that the bank knows the true portfolio risk. However, as the current crisis clearly suggests, this may not always be the case.
What if we relax this assumption? Recall that the principal virtue of ex post regulation is that it makes full use of the bank's specialized information on underlying risk. If the bank has no such specialized information, the advantage vanishes. On the other hand, the relative advantage of ex ante regulation, arising from the fact that it is less sensitive to regulatory uncertainty about the risk preference of the bank, still holds. Therefore, for a bank with poor risk management, pure ex ante regulation is optimal.
Only when regulators are satisfied that a bank has developed sufficient expertise in measuring risk should they move towards including ex post incentives. This is the intuition behind the following result.
Result 7 If the bank has no private information on s, regulating through only ex ante constraints is optimal.
Absence of full control through penalties
In section 5, we assume that the regulator can control all types with penalties. However, for banks with very low capital, there might be limited scope for early intervention. In such cases, feasible penalties may generate weak incentives, and not able to control all types of managers. To extend our analysis to such cases, suppose there is a critical type Finally, pillar 3 requires greater disclosure from banks, and can potentially introduce ex post penalties in the form of an adverse market reaction to bad news (for example, when banks disclose higher risk exposure).
However, market discipline is outside the scope of the current paper.
Conclusion
The 1988 The discussion above assumes that the bank has superior information on underlying risk. If, however, the bank's information on risk is poor, it is optimal to use only ex ante regulation. This explains why it is important for the regulator to assess the risk management abilities of a bank before choosing the appropriate form of regulation.
While our analysis generates robust insights, there are certain practical problems with ex ante and ex post regulation that are beyond the scope of our simple model. As Jones (2000) points out, banks might make cosmetic adjustments that reduce the regulatory measure of risk, and therefore cap-ital requirement, even though actual risk is unchanged. Such "regulatory capital arbitrage" reduces the effectiveness of ex ante regulation. The regulatory arbitrage engaged by banks prior to the current crisis whereby
CDOs of mortgage backed securities were treated under market risk capital regulation, instead of the more stringent credit risk capital rules, may well be one of the main factors behind the widespread underestimation of risk and inadequate capital levels that became apparent as the crisis unfolded.
A second practical problem faced by both regimes is regulatory forbearance, which undermines enforcement. As Calomiris (1999) as well as SFRC (2000) discuss, a potential solution is to make use of market discipline induced by market price signals of mandatory subordinated debt.
However, the efficacy of such a solution is questionable in times of crisis, since asset prices become unreliable signals of underlying value. A formal analysis of these problems is a matter for future research.
Notes
1 Kahane (1977) , Koehn and Santomero (1980) , Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992) show that a flat-rate capital requirement might increase risk in bank portfolio.
Relaxing the assumption of zero net present value assets, Gennotte and Pyle (1991) show that capital standards based on accounting value could lead to an increase in risk taking. Kim and Santomero (1988) and Rochet (1992) show how a move to risk-adjusted capital requirements might solve the problem and calculate optimal risk weights in a setting with no asymmetric information. Besanko and Kanatas (1996) consider a model with moral hazard, and show that capital regulation can cause risk of bank assets to increase because regulation leads to effort aversion by bank management. See Calomiris (1999) for a succinct overview of the reasons behind and the problems arising from deposit insurance.
2 See Chan, Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992 Freixas and Rochet (1997) (chapter 2) for a discussion on the role of asymmetric information in justifying the existence of banks. 8 A penalty structure is regressive if a higher penalty has a greater marginal impact on the optimal choice of types with lower risk aversion. 9 The Federal Reserve has recently required major US banks to undertake a comprehensive stress-testing exercise under the "Supervisory Capital Assessment Program", to be completed by April 2009, to ascertain their ability to withstand a protracted scenario of economic recession. In January 2009 the Basel Committee also proposed to require banks to calculate a stressed VaR for their market risk positions. 10 This can also be thought of as the tangency portfolio between the efficient frontier with all assets and that with only risky assets. 11 Using log return is the standard practice. Log return has the entire real line as range, and therefore allows the use of a normal distribution. 12 Indeed, the managerial preference ordering as described can be represented by the fol-
where V is the log final value of the bank's assets (since the initial asset value is 1, the final asset value is given by exp( V), implying that its log is simply V). Expected utility is then given by − exp −ρ αβs − ρ 2 α 2 s 2 . It follows that the manager can simply maximize αβs − (ρ/2)α 2 s 2 with respect to α. The optimal choice is α * = β/(ρs). Therefore the optimal risk of type ρ is σ * = α * s = β/ρ.
13 Our analysis does not require any specific relation between K and ρ. In general, it is likely that ρ decreases in K. However, for very low capital, some types might take high risk. See also footnote 18. 14 Seminal work by Leland and Pyle (1977) shows how a cost of capital can arise due to information asymmetry, which distorts investment decisions when the bank must raise funds from uninformed outsiders. Besanko and Kanatas (1996) show that recapitalization might dilute managerial effort-provision incentives and lower share price. Indeed, as Hellmann et al. (2000) note, if capital were not costly, the problem of excessive risk taking (in the pursuit of private gains) by the bank ownership would hardly be as severe as empirical evidence suggests, as regulators would simply set high capital requirements and banks would comply willingly. 15 Given that initial asset value is 1, it follows that 0 < 1 − K < 1 implying ln − K + 1 is well defined (and negative), and that K > 0. 16 This is not unreasonable, since for p not too high (which should be the case), Φ −1 (1 − p) is large, and the slope of the efficient frontier β is typically less than 1. 17 Clearly, in a situation like the current crisis which is characterized by both widespread bank fragility and a credit crunch the choice of how to weight overprotection loss and safety loss is particularly difficult. On the one hand, banks need to be encouraged to lend. On the other hand, it is important to lower leverage to restore confidence in banks. So far, regulators and governments in the US and UK have attempted to address the problem through tighter bank capital regulation (high weight on safety loss), and complemented with unprecedented levels of central bank interventions to restore lending and alleviate the credit crunch.
18 For example, a sufficient condition for this is that the distribution of ρ shifts down (in the sense of being first order stochastically dominated) at a high enough rate as K increases, so that at any level of K there are types who want to take more risk than the socially optimal risk. 19 If ρ 0 ρ L , regulation is unnecessary. On the other hand, if we make the stronger assumption that ρ 0 > ρ H , our results remain qualitatively unaffected. 20 Removing the restriction would imply that for low values of ω, optimal regulation involves a lower limit on risk (ex ante) and a reward for higher risk (ex post). This would make the algebra much more complicated, but not gain in terms of policy relevant results since standard regulatory regimes studied here have no lower limit provisions. 21 Risk can also be measured by banks under restrictive guidelines set by the regulator.
In this case we can think of the regulator forcing a particular estimate of s through the restrictions. 22 Imposing some ex ante limit puts an upper bound on risk taking, which substantially increases the usability of ex post incentives. 23 These include compulsory capital restoration plans, asset growth limits, restriction on transactions with affiliates, restrictions on deposit interest rates and liquidation. See Benston and Kaufman (1997) for a review of the effectiveness of the act. 24 Taylor (2002) discusses a similar idea.
25 Such measures are not uncommon. For example in the UK, a director of an insolvent company can be legally disqualified even in the absence of any dishonest behavior, if the director was negligent or incompetent. Under the 1986 Company Directors Disqualification Act, individuals can be forbidden from acting as a director for up to 15 years. 26 To see this, suppose two different types adopt the same portfolio for some value of s. Given that they face the same penalty function, they must face the same distribution of outcomes. But if two different types face exactly the same distribution of returns, their optimal choice of portfolio cannot be the same, which contradicts the original statement. 27 Note that when log return equals minus infinity the actual loss is finite and equal to the initial value of the bank's assets. Since penalties are also therefore defined in the log return domain, they are finite. 28 The same is true for the 1996 Amendment that is concerned with capital requirements for the bank's trading book. 29 However, unlike Basel 1988 where each debt attracts a capital charge that only depends on the type of debtor (sovereign, bank, corporate, householder), the Standardized Approach is also based on "external" credit ratings. 30 The IRB approach itself includes two variants: a "foundation" version which is close to the standardized approach, and an "advanced" version, which allows greater flexibility. 
